Mr. Lincoln's T-Mails PDF Free Download

How Abraham Lincoln used the new technology of telegraphy to win the war and transform national leadership.

One night two years ago, I was watching the evening news coverage of the war in Iraq. A video showed a huge headquarters tent filled with soldiers and airmen sitting at computer terminals and sending electronic messages— some to the front lines to position troops and deliver intelligence, some to the rear to bring up the supplies necessary to keep the army advancing. It struck me: “This is war by e-mail.”

  1. William Marvel talked about his book, Mr. Lincoln Goes to War, published by Houghton Mifflin. The book takes a new look at the Civil War and faults both Abraham Lincoln and Jefferson Davis for.
  2. Lincoln was hatched at the American Eagle Foundation’s Eagle Mountain Sanctuary. He was raised by his parents, a non-releasable breeding pair named Liberty and Justice, until eight weeks of age and was then taken along with his siblings to the AEF’s hacking tower on Douglas Lake. Lincoln was released, he flew 550 miles during.

And confirmed by the U.S. Senate in November 2013.1 P rior to worki ng at the FCC, Wheeler worked as a venture capitalist and lobbyist for the cable and w ireless industr y, whom the FCC is now responsible for regulating, and holding positions including President of the National Cable & Telecommunications Association. Lincoln is available to share his remarkable story in schools, in churches, and at libraries, senior residence centers, community events, etc. In addition to providing a firsthand account of his own life and times, Mr. Lincoln's visit will also do much more. The exceptional red rich color, stately lines, and the exciting fragrance make this an exceptional Hybrid tea. However, its ability to flourish in all regions makes Mister Lincoln the finest red Hybrid tea of all time. Height: 5-7 Feet. Spread: 2- Feet.

Shortly thereafter, touring the National Archives with a small group, I had the opportunity to visit the vaults. Among the items shown to us by an archivist of military records was a book of glassine pages, each containing a handwritten telegram in the precise, forward-slanting cursive of Abraham Lincoln. As I looked through the pages, my vocation as a telecommunications executive and my avocation as an amateur historian collided. Turning in awe to the archivist, I said, “These are Mr. Lincoln’s T-mails.”

What I held in my hands that day was a record of the first time telecommunication was used as a regular part of national leadership. At a time when the Union cause was faltering in the field, the president embraced the capability of electronic messaging to impose his leadership in a manner and to a depth never before permitted any other leader in history. The telegraph changed the nature of national executive leadership and provided Lincoln with a tool that helped him win the Civil War.

Like most of the people it represented, the U.S. government was slow in awakening to the opportunity presented by the telegraph. When Lincoln took office, if a government agency wished to send a telegram, an employee was sent to queue up at the central telegraph office. At the outbreak of the war, even an agency as essential as the War Department was not connected to the telegraph network.

Like his countrymen and his government, the president had to learn how to use the telegraph. Lincoln’s added challenge, of course, was that his learning curve occurred amidst a military conflict to determine the fate of the national union. Time and again, that conflict would provide him with opportunities to test the new technology and his exploration of its communications and leadership powers, beginning with the war’s first major battle.

The Union route to the Confederate capital at Richmond ran through Manassas, Va., approximately 30 miles west of Washington, a railroad junction near a key pass through the Bull Run Mountains. There, on the plain beside the small, steep-sided stream that gave the mountains their name, Brig. Gen. Irvin McDowell planned to attack the Confederates while another Union force on the opposite side of the Blue Ridge Mountains attempted to keep the Rebels in that area bottled up and out of the action.

The Union Army’s plan was based on the old realities of horse-mounted messengers and plodding troop marches. The new reality was expanded battlefield capabilities made possible by two new civilian technologies: rail transport and speedy telegraph messages. The application of these two new innovations greatly affected the outcome of the battle.

The telegraph summoned transport trains and Rebel troops to Manassas. For the first time in the history of warfare, troops were carried directly to the field of battle by train. After giving the slip to the Union force that was supposed to keep them caged, Confederate soldiers were loaded into boxcars. The troops moved faster than any army in history ever had; one moment they were too far from the action to be decisive, the next moment they were on the battlefield. Their arrival turned the tide on July 21, 1861.

The president and the other national leaders in Washington could hear the cannons’ thunder on the horizon, yet there was an almost unreal lack of involvement in the first engagement at Manassas. General-in-Chief Winfield Scott, hero of the Mexican War but now fighting a new war by the same old rules, was so accepting of the tradition of being unable to communicate rapidly with the front that he took a nap during the battle. Lincoln had to awaken him as the fighting raged.

Before the Battle of Bull Run, Andrew Carnegie, who had begun his career as a telegraph operator for the Pennsylvania Railroad, was placed in charge of extending the telegraph lines across the Potomac River into occupied Rebel territory. By the time of the battle, however, the line reached only as far as Fairfax Court House, about 10 miles east of Bull Run. In a hybrid of the old and new, messengers galloped from the battlefield to the end of the telegraph line carrying news. “Lincoln hardly left his seat in our office and waited with deep anxiety for each succeeding despatch,” recorded the telegraph office manager.

Thirteen months later, when the armies clashed again along Bull Run, it was a decidedly different commander in chief who took up residence in the War Department telegraph office. The office had become the president’s Situation Room, where he not only monitored events through incoming messages but also initiated communications directly to the field. Lincoln became so involved with the flow of information during Second Manassas that he did not return to the White House for sleep, preferring instead a cot that had been set up in the telegraph office.

Unable to communicate with his key generals because the Rebel forces had cut their telegraph lines, Lincoln opened a telegraphic dialogue with a subordinate officer that continued over the next several days. The telegrams between Lincoln and Colonel Herman Haupt were at one point the national leadership’s best source of information from the front. It was another historic moment: a national leader electronically engaged in monitoring the activities of a battle at which he was not present.

Throughout the entire history of armed conflict, the ability to have a virtually instantaneous exchange between a national leader at the seat of government and his forces in the field had been impossible. As a result, field commanders had come close to being living gods. Cut off from the national leadership, the unilateral decisions of generals at the front determined not only the fate of individual lives but also the future of nations. It was for this reason that heads of government, such as Henry V at Agincourt or Bonaparte in Russia, had remained in the field with their troops to combine both national and military leadership.

American wars had always been fought differently, with the head of government removed from the scene of battle. Had the traditional model of generals divorced from speedy interaction with the national leadership persisted, the result of the Civil War could have been quite different. Lincoln’s embrace of the telegraph allowed him to keep tabs on distant activities—almost a keyhole into his generals’ quarters—and to insert himself when necessary.

The government that Lincoln took over had not been very adroit at embracing the management possibilities of the telegraph. The U.S. Army’s major use of the technology, for instance, was for coordinating the ordering and shipment of supplies and personnel. The most notable involvement Lincoln’s predecessor, James Buchanan, had with the telegraph was a ceremonial message he sent Queen Victoria in 1858 on the occasion of the completion of the trans-Atlantic cable. After having a telegraph station set up in the White House for the ceremony, Buchanan had it removed once the exchange was completed.

As telegraph technology was incorporated into government activity early in Lincoln’s term, it was organized to favor serving the military, not the civilian leadership. Lincoln learned early on how the party that controls the electronic conduit controls both its information and the application of that information. It was a lesson painfully realized as the result of yet another battlefield defeat—a battle that touched the president personally.

Three months after the Union lost its first major engagement along Bull Run, yet another debacle occurred, this time along the banks of the Potomac. Federal troops ferried across the river into Virginia were stacked up in an indefensible position atop a riverside escarpment known as Ball’s Bluff. Killed leading his troops on the battlefield was Colonel Edward Baker, a former Illinois congressman and U.S. senator from Oregon—and an extremely close friend of the president.

Telegraph dispatches reporting the disaster arrived at the headquarters of the commanding general, George McClellan, while he was at the White House meeting with the president. Although the message was rushed to him during the meeting, McClellan did not discuss its contents with his commander in chief.

Perhaps sensing that something was amiss, Lincoln later in the day wandered over to McClellan’s headquarters a few blocks from the White House and inquired of the telegraph operator, Thomas Eckert, whether any dispatches had arrived from the front. Eckert, however, had been ordered to give dispatches only to the general. He slipped the Ball’s Bluff message under his desk blotter and told the president there was nothing new “in the file.” Lincoln then walked into McClellan’s office, where he saw a copy of the report on the general’s desk.

Returning to the telegrapher’s office, a less-than-pleased commander in chief demanded to know why the clerk had withheld the information. It was only then that the president learned of the standing orders to share such information only with McClellan. The telegraph operator argued he had told the truth while also following his orders; by slipping the offending telegram under his blotter, he had been technically truthful in telling the president there were no new messages in the file.

It was an untenable situation. Secretary of War Simon Cameron had ceded control of electronic information to the military, even to the exclusion of the elected government. A growing number of such lapses in judgment convinced Lincoln to exile Cameron by making him minister to Russia. In January 1862, Edwin Stanton became the new secretary of war.

When Congress returned that same January, it enacted legislation allowing the government to take control of the telegraph lines as necessary for military purposes. Secretary Stanton’s War Department, not McClellan’s headquarters, became the hub for all telegraph traffic. It was a decisive moment in the leadership of the war. Communication with the nation’s military forces was now in civilian hands. The ability to review developments in the field on an ongoing basis was no longer the exclusive purview of men in uniform. Most important, moving the telegraph office from McClellan’s headquarters to the War Department building next to the White House placed Lincoln near the technology and opened the door to his discovery of electronic leadership.

The cortex of the nation’s electronic information network became a series of rooms adjoining Stanton’s office at the War Department, a nondescript four-story rectangular box next to the White House. One special room, between the instruments themselves and Secretary Stanton’s office, became Lincoln’s hideaway. Only there was he comparatively free from interruption, and he would frequently remain for hours and sometimes all night. The president would set up shop at the desk of the chief of the operation, next to a window overlooking Pennsylvania Avenue. Sequestered in his hideaway, Lincoln would take his pen or pencil in hand, smooth out the sheet of paper carefully and write slowly and deliberately, stopping at times in thoughtful contemplation to look out the window for a moment or two, and then resume his writing. Because the procedure was for a message to be handwritten before being given to the telegraph operator for transmission, most of Lincoln’s original messages still exist.

The more time the president spent in the telegraph office, the more he evolved his use of the technology from a tool for simply sending messages into a means of obtaining a bird’s-eye overview of developments at distant points and a keyhole into his generals’ thinking. “His thoughts by day and anxiety by night fed upon the intelligence which the telegraph brought,” the president’s secretary noted.

At times of breaking news, Lincoln would hover over the shoulder of the telegraph operator, reading the dispatch word by word as it was decoded. Most often, however, Lincoln’s review of the material consisted of the simple ritual of opening the telegraph clerk’s desk drawer and reading all the dispatches that had been received since his last visit. Although a simple process, it was a revolutionary breakthrough that gave Lincoln an almost real-time understanding of activities for which previous national leaders would have waited days or weeks.

A personal news service is of limited value, however, unless something is done with the information. Lincoln acted on his discoveries in the desk drawer even if he was intruding into an exchange that had not included him. The telegraph was the president’s “big ear” to eavesdrop on what was going on in the field and his “long arm” for projecting leadership that was now informed by the newly garnered information.

The late summer of 1864, for instance, was yet another dark hour in the North. The Federal advance to Richmond had stalled, and Lt. Gen. Ulysses Grant was the target of mounting criticism. Confederate troops were advancing north through the Shenandoah Valley. The fall presidential election was only a few months away. Unable to deliver either victory or peace and facing draft riot upheaval in some major Northern cities, Lincoln anticipated electoral defeat. It was in this environment that the president read a telegram between Grant and the army chief of staff in which the general-in-chief fretted about the depletion of frontline forces to quell the draft riots.

The telegraph clerk’s drawer having provided a window into Grant’s concerns, Lincoln used the same messenger to interpose himself, share his resolve and allay the commanding general’s concerns: “I have seen your despatch expressing your unwillingness to break your hold where you are. Neither am I willing. Hold on with a bull-dog grip, and chew and choke, as much as possible.” It was as good as walking into Grant’s headquarters, sizing up the general’s state of mind and responding through conversation. The very phrase “hold on with a bull-dog grip” even resembles a verbal repartee more than a through-channels dispatch.

Grant’s response proved the value of Lincoln’s intercession. As he put down Lincoln’s telegram, the general, who had been beleaguered by criticism that even called him a butcher for pursuing strategies that Lincoln endorsed, laughed out loud and exclaimed to those around him, “The president has more nerve than any of his advisers.” Grant was correct in his observation, of course. More important, however, Grant had just held in his hands Lincoln’s implement for reinforcing his resolve and making sure that neither distance nor intermediaries diffused the president’s leadership.

As the president grew to appreciate its capabilities, the telegraph became a surrogate for the transactional give-and-take of a face-to-face discussion. Lincoln could not walk into a general’s tent the way he walked into Washington offices, so he used the telegraph to establish a virtual conversation. While, for the most part, the president continued to transmit official orders through the chain of command, he used his own electronic messages to add color, substance and animation to those orders. His telegrams to generals in the field added flesh to the bones of the official dispatches much as one would do in a one-on-one conversation.

As Robert E. Lee’s Confederates maneuvered in the early summer of 1863 toward what ultimately would be the Battle of Gettysburg, Lincoln electronically dialogued with Maj. Gen. Joseph Hooker commanding the Army of the Potomac. Only a month before, Hooker had been humiliated by Lee at the Battle of Chancellorsville. On June 5, the general had telegraphed the president, ostensibly to clarify his overall orders but actually to float a trial balloon proposing that he attack the forces left behind by Lee. Lincoln quickly responded and spoke to Hooker in a colloquial manner that could leave no doubt as to the commander in chief’s opinion about his general’s proposal: “Yours of today received an hour ago…. I have but one idea which I think worth suggesting to you, and that is in case you find Lee coming to the North of the Rappahannock, I would by no means cross to the South of it….In one word, I would not take any risk of being entangled upon the river, like an ox jumped half over a fence, and liable to be torn by dogs, front and rear, without a fair chance to gore one way and kick the other.”

Mr. Lincoln's T-Mails PDF Free Download

Five days later, Hooker again floated a new idea via telegram addressed to “His Excellency The President of the United States.” This time he wanted to move south and attack the Confederate capital. Hooker’s telegram, sent at 2:30 p.m. on June 10, was replied to by Lincoln at 6:40 the same day. Again, the president conversationally conveyed to Hooker what he felt were the errors in the general’s judgment and reminded his commander as to the objective of the Army: “If left to me, I would not go South of the Rappahannock, upon Lee’s moving North of it…I think Lee’s army, and not Richmond, is your true objective point [emphasis in original].”

The spirits of leaders past must have looked on Abraham Lincoln with envy as he transposed the techniques of face-to-face dialogue into electronic exchanges that imposed his will onto the decision making of distant generals as though he was with them in the field.

Today we often see photographs of the president in the White House Situation Room dealing with commanders in the field through communications technologies that, themselves, are derivative of the telegraph. That such instantaneous communications are such a common occurrence in our lives makes it difficult for us to appreciate just how foreign the idea was in the mid-19th century. Abraham Lincoln could look to no other national leader’s use of the telegraph for guidance. Without text or tutor the rail-splitter from the prairie applied his early-adopter instincts to the new electronic technology. In the process he transformed the nature of leadership and built the modern electronic leadership model.

This article is adapted from Mr. Lincoln’s T-mails by Tom Wheeler. Copyright©2006 by Tom Wheeler. Published by arrangement with HarperCollins Publishers.

Originally published in the April 2007 issue of Civil War Times. To subscribe, click here.

Chair of the Federal Communications Commission
In office
November 4, 2013 – January 20, 2017
PresidentBarack Obama
Preceded byJulius Genachowski
Succeeded byAjit Pai
Personal details
Born
Thomas Edgar Wheeler

April 5, 1946 (age 75)
Redlands, California, U.S.
Political partyDemocratic
EducationThe Ohio State University (BA)

Thomas Edgar Wheeler (born April 5, 1946)[1][2] is an American businessman and politician. He was the 31st Chairman of the Federal Communications Commission and a member of the Democratic Party.[3][4]

He was appointed by President Barack Obama and confirmed by the U.S. Senate in November 2013.[1] Prior to working at the FCC, Wheeler worked as a venture capitalist and lobbyist for the cable and wireless industry, whom the FCC is now responsible for regulating, and holding positions including President of the National Cable & Telecommunications Association (NCTA) and CEO of the Cellular Telecommunications & Internet Association (CTIA). Following custom for an FCC chairman, Wheeler resigned his seat when the new administration of Donald Trump began on January 20, 2017, and was succeeded by Ajit Pai.[5][6]

Career[edit]

Wheeler was born on April 5, 1946 in Redlands, California. He attended Ohio State University.[7] From 1969 to 1976, Wheeler led the trade group Grocery Manufacturers of America.[8] He then went on to work at the National Cable & Telecommunications Association from 1976 to 1984, becoming president of the trade group in 1979. For a year until its closure, Wheeler was president of NABU Network, before spending a number of years creating or running several different technology startups. In 1992, he became the CEO of the Cellular Telecommunications & Internet Association, a post he held until 2004.[9] From 2005 Wheeler was a technology entrepreneur and executive at Core Capital Partners.[10][11]

Originally considered a frontrunner for the position,[12] Wheeler was confirmed as the new Federal Communications Commission chief in November 2013[13] following a confirmation hearing before the United States Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation.[14] Despite a letter written by several prominent former Obama administration officials endorsing Wheeler for the position, many people expressed concern over the consideration of Wheeler for the position due to his history of lobbying for industry.[12]

In recognition of his work in promoting the wireless industry, Wheeler was inducted into the Wireless Hall of Fame in 2003 and in 2009, as a result of his work in promoting the growth and prosperity of the cable television industry and its stakeholders, was inducted into the Cable Television Hall of Fame.[9][15][16] He is the only person who is a member of both halls of fame.[10]Cablevision magazine named Wheeler one of the 20 most influential individuals in its history during cable's 20th anniversary in 1995.[9]

During Barack Obama's 2008 presidential campaign, Wheeler spent six weeks in Iowa aiding his campaign efforts and went on to raise over US$500,000 for Obama's campaigns.[12][17]

Net neutrality[edit]

In late April 2014, the contours of a document leaked that indicated that the FCC under Wheeler would consider announcing rules that would violate net neutrality principles by making it easier for companies to pay ISPs (including cable companies and wireless ISPs) to provide faster 'lanes' for delivering their content to Internet users.[18] These plans received substantial backlash from activists, the mainstream press, and some other FCC commissioners.[19][20] In May 2014, over 100 Internet companies—including Google, Microsoft, eBay, and Facebook—signed a letter to Wheeler voicing their disagreement with his plans, saying they represented a 'grave threat to the Internet'.[21] As of May 15, 2014, the 'Internet fast lane' rules passed with a 3–2 vote. They were then open to public discussion that ended July 2014.[22]

In November 2014, President Obama gave a speech endorsing the classification of ISPs as utilities under Title II of the Communications Act of 1934.[23] Wheeler stated in January 2015 that the FCC was 'going to propose rules that say no blocking, no throttling, no paid prioritization' at the Consumer Electronics Show in Las Vegas.[24][25] On January 31, 2015, the Associated Press reported the FCC will present the notion of applying ('with some caveats') Title II (common carrier) of the Communications Act of 1934 to the Internet in a vote expected on February 26, 2015.[26][27][28][29][30] Adoption of this notion would reclassify Internet service from one of information to one of telecommunications[31] and, according to Wheeler, ensure US net neutrality.[32][33] The FCC was expected to enforce net neutrality in its vote, according to the New York Times.[34][35]

Movie Young Mr. Lincoln 1939

On February 26, 2015, the FCC ruled in favor of net neutrality by applying Title II of the Communications Act of 1934 and Section 706 of the Telecommunications act of 1996 to the Internet.[36][37][38] Wheeler commented, 'This is no more a plan to regulate the Internet than the First Amendment is a plan to regulate free speech. They both stand for the same concept.'[39][40] On March 12, 2015, the FCC released the specific details of the net neutrality rules.[41][42][43] On April 13, 2015, the FCC published the final rule on its new 'Net Neutrality' regulations.[44][45][46]

Critics said that Wheeler was unduly influenced by Obama in changing his stance on net neutrality.[23] In addition, journalists and advocates have expressed concern regarding the potential for inappropriate involvement by the White House over rule making at the FCC, which is supposed to be an independent agency.[47] During a House Oversight Committee hearing in March 2015, Republicans disclosed that Wheeler had secretly met with top aides at the White House nine times while the new rules were being formulated. Wheeler responded that the new rules had not been discussed during the meetings. This prompted the committee chairman to state, 'You meet with the White House multiple times ... and we're supposed to believe that one of the most important things the FCC has ever done, that this doesn't come up?'[48]

Bibliography[edit]

  • Wheeler, Tom, Take Command!: Leadership Lessons from the Civil War. New York: Currency Doubleday, 2000. ISBN0385495188OCLC232697696
  • Wheeler, Tom, Mr. Lincoln's T-Mails: The Untold Story of How Abraham Lincoln Used the Telegraph to Win the Civil War. New York: Collins, 2006. ISBN006112978XOCLC70046076

References[edit]

  1. ^ ab'Presidential Nominations Sent to the Senate'. whitehouse.gov. May 9, 2013. Retrieved December 30, 2014 – via National Archives.
  2. ^Tom Southwick (July 26, 2000). 'Oral Histories: Thomas Wheeler'. The Cable Center. Retrieved December 30, 2014.
  3. ^Wheeler, Tom (March 29, 2017). 'How the Republicans Sold Your Privacy to Internet Providers'. New York Times. Retrieved March 29, 2017.
  4. ^The Editorial Board (March 29, 2017). 'Republicans Attack Internet Privacy'. New York Times. Retrieved March 29, 2017.
  5. ^Allen Cone (December 15, 2016). 'FCC Chairman Tom Wheeler to resign'. United Press International. Retrieved January 31, 2017.
  6. ^'Tom Wheeler: The open internet's unlikely defender'. CNET. Retrieved June 13, 2017.
  7. ^Nagesh, Gautham (April 24, 2014). 'FCC Chairman Tom Wheeler Makes the Call, Takes the Flak'. The Wall Street Journal. Retrieved May 8, 2014.
  8. ^Patrick Parsons (April 5, 2008). Blue Skies: A History of Cable Television. Temple University Press. p. 377.
  9. ^ abcNeel, K.C. (October 26, 2009). 'Always Ahead of the Curve.(Core Capital Partners managing director Tom Wheeler)'. Multichannel News. via HighBeam (subscription required). Archived from the original on June 11, 2014. Retrieved May 8, 2014.
  10. ^ abGustin, Sam (May 2, 2013). 'Tom Wheeler, Former Lobbyist and Obama Fundraiser, Tapped to Lead FCC'. TIME. Retrieved May 8, 2014.
  11. ^Jr, Berkeley Lovelace (December 15, 2016). 'Net neutrality advocate Tom Wheeler stepping down as FCC chairman'. Retrieved June 13, 2017.
  12. ^ abcGustin, Sam (April 16, 2013). 'Tom Wheeler, Former Lobbyist and Obama Loyalist, Seen as FCC Frontrunner'. TIME. Retrieved May 8, 2014.
  13. ^Blanchard, Roy (November 2, 2013). 'Tom Wheeler confirmed as new FCC chief'. Tech Times. Retrieved May 8, 2014.
  14. ^Nomination of Thomas E. Wheeler to be Chairman of the Federal Communications Commission: Hearing before the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, United States Senate, One Hundred Thirteenth Congress, First Session, June 18, 2013
  15. ^'Tom Wheeler'. Cable Center. Retrieved May 8, 2014.
  16. ^'Tom Wheeler'. Wireless History Foundation. Retrieved May 8, 2014.
  17. ^'Obama to appoint cable industry lobbyist Tom Wheeler as FCC head'. The Guardian. May 1, 2013. Retrieved May 8, 2014.
  18. ^Wyatt, Edward (April 23, 2014). 'F.C.C., in a shift, backs fast lanes for web traffic'. New York Times. Retrieved May 8, 2014.
  19. ^Hattem, Julian (April 25, 2014). 'NYT blasts net neutrality proposal'. The Hill. Retrieved May 8, 2014.
  20. ^Gustin, Sam (May 7, 2014). 'Net Neutrality: FCC Boss Smacked by Tech Giants, Internal Dissent'. TIME. Retrieved May 8, 2014.
  21. ^Nagesh, Gautham (May 7, 2014). 'Internet Companies, Two FCC Commissioners Disagree With Proposed Broadband Regulations'. Wall Street Journal. Retrieved May 8, 2014.
  22. ^Edwards, Haley Sweetland (May 15, 2014). 'FCC Votes to Move Forward on Internet 'Fast Lane''. Time. Retrieved May 20, 2014.
  23. ^ abWheeler: Obama didn't influence net neutrality vote Yahoo! Finance, March 3, 2015
  24. ^FCC Head Plans to Heed Obama Blueprint to Ban Web Fast LanesDallas Morning News, January 7, 2015
  25. ^Title II for Internet providers is all but confirmed by FCC chairman Ars Technica, January 7, 2015
  26. ^Lohr, Steve (February 2, 2015). 'In Net Neutrality Push, F.C.C. Is Expected to Propose Regulating Internet Service as a Utility'. New York Times. Retrieved February 2, 2015.
  27. ^Lohr, Steve (February 2, 2015). 'F.C.C. Chief Wants to Override State Laws Curbing Community Net Services'. New York Times. Retrieved February 2, 2015.
  28. ^Flaherty, Anne (January 31, 2015). 'Just whose Internet is it? New federal rules may answer that'. Associated Press. Retrieved January 31, 2015.
  29. ^Fung, Brian (January 2, 2015). 'Get ready: The FCC says it will vote on net neutrality in February'. Washington Post. Retrieved January 2, 2015.
  30. ^'FCC to vote next month on net neutrality rules'. Associated Press. January 2, 2015. Retrieved January 2, 2015.
  31. ^Lohr, Steve (February 4, 2015). 'F.C.C. Plans Strong Hand to Regulate the Internet'. New York Times. Retrieved February 5, 2015.
  32. ^Wheeler, Tom (February 4, 2015). 'FCC Chairman Tom Wheeler: This Is How We Will Ensure Net Neutrality'. Wired. Retrieved February 5, 2015.
  33. ^The Editorial Board (February 6, 2015). 'Courage and Good Sense at the F.C.C. - Net Neutrality's Wise New Rules'. New York Times. Retrieved February 6, 2015.
  34. ^Weisman, Jonathan (February 24, 2015). 'As Republicans Concede, F.C.C. Is Expected to Enforce Net Neutrality'. New York Times. Retrieved February 24, 2015.
  35. ^Lohr, Steve (February 25, 2015). 'The Push for Net Neutrality Arose From Lack of Choice'. New York Times. Retrieved February 25, 2015.
  36. ^'FCC Adopts Strong, Sustainable Rules To Protect The Open Internet'(PDF). Federal Communications Commission. February 26, 2015. Retrieved February 26, 2015.
  37. ^Ruiz, Rebecca R.; Lohr, Steve (February 26, 2015). 'In Net Neutrality Victory, F.C.C. Classifies Broadband Internet Service as a Public Utility'. New York Times. Retrieved February 26, 2015.
  38. ^Flaherty, Anne (February 25, 2015). 'FACT CHECK: Talking heads skew 'net neutrality' debate'. Associated Press. Retrieved February 26, 2015.
  39. ^Liebelson, Dana (February 26, 2015). 'Net Neutrality Prevails In Historic FCC Vote'. The Huffington Post. Retrieved February 26, 2015.
  40. ^Bennett, Richard. 'The Internet has lots of problems but net neutrality isn't the most pressing'. MIT Technology Review. Retrieved June 13, 2017.
  41. ^Ruiz, Rebecca R. (March 12, 2015). 'F.C.C. Sets Net Neutrality Rules'. New York Times. Retrieved March 13, 2015.
  42. ^Sommer, Jeff (March 12, 2015). 'What the Net Neutrality Rules Say'. New York Times. Retrieved March 13, 2015.
  43. ^'Federal Communications Commission – FCC 15-24 – In the Matter of Protecting and Promoting the Open Internet – GN Docket No. 14-28 – Report and Order on Remand, Declaratory Ruling, and Order'(PDF). Federal Communications Commission. March 12, 2015. Retrieved March 13, 2015.
  44. ^Reisinger, Don (April 13, 2015). 'Net neutrality rules get published -- let the lawsuits begin'. CNET. Retrieved April 13, 2015.
  45. ^Federal Communications Commission (April 13, 2015). 'Protecting and Promoting the Open Internet – A Rule by the Federal Communications Commission on 04/13/2015'. Federal Register. Retrieved April 13, 2015.
  46. ^'Why you should support net neutrality'. San Francisco Chronicle. Retrieved June 13, 2017.
  47. ^Hattem, Julian (March 17, 2015). 'FCC head has no answer for FOIA redactions'. The Hill. Retrieved March 11, 2016.
  48. ^Hattem, Julian (March 17, 2015). 'Republicans confront FCC chief about secret White House meetings'. The Hill. Retrieved March 11, 2016.

External links[edit]

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